B. „éves átbocsátás”: a 79. és 80. cikk alkalmazásában az a nukleáris anyagmennyiség, amelyet egy névleges teljesítményen üzemelő létesítményből évenként kiszállítanak.
C. „adag”: a nukleáris anyagnak az a mérési kulcspontokon, nyilvántartási egységként kezelt mennyisége, amelyre az előírás vagy a mérés szerint egyetlen összetételi és mennyiségi adat vonatkozik. A nukleáris anyag lehet ömlesztett formában vagy különálló tételek tartalmazhatják.
D. „adagadatok”: a nukleáris anyag minden egyes alkotóelemének a teljes súlya, valamint a plutónium és az urán esetében az izotópösszetétel is. Az elszámolás egységei a következők:
a) a plutóniumtartalom grammban;
b) a teljes uránmennyiség grammban, valamint az urán-235 és az urán-233 együttes mennyisége az ezen izotópokkal dúsított urán esetében, grammban;
c) a tórium, a természetes urán vagy a szegényített urán mennyisége kilogrammban.
A jelentések céljára az adagon belüli egyedi tételeket össze kell adni még a legközelebbi egységre történő adatkerekítés előtt.
E. „könyv szerinti leltár”: adott anyagmérlegkörzet legutóbbi tényleges leltárának és a tényleges leltár felvétele óta bekövetkezett leltárváltozásnak az algebrai összege.
F. „helyesbítés”: bejegyzés egy könyvelési tételhez vagy jelentéshez egy feltárt hiba helyesbítése, vagy a jelentésbe előzőleg bevitt mennyiség javított mérési adatának feltüntetése érdekében. Minden egyes helyesbítésnél meg kell határozni, melyik bejegyzéshez tartozik.
G. „effektív kilogramm”: különleges, a nukleáris biztosítéki ellenőrzés terén alkalmazott mértékegység. Az effektív kilogrammot a következőképpen kell meghatározni:
a) plutónium esetében a súly kilogrammban;
b) a kilogrammban mért súly értékét megszorozva a dúsítás négyzetével a 0,01 (1%) vagy ennél nagyobb dúsítású urán esetében;
c) a kilogrammban mért súly értékét megszorozva 0,0001-gyel a 0,01 (1%)-nál kisebb és 0,005-tel (0,5%)-nál nagyobb dúsítású urán esetében;
d) a kilogrammban mért súly értékét megszorozva 0,00005-tel a 0,005 (0,5%), vagy az ennél kisebb dúsítású szegényített urán és a tórium esetében.
H. „dúsítás”: az urán-233 és az urán-235 együttes súlyának és a szóban forgó urán teljes súlyának aránya.
I. „létesítmény”:
a) reaktor, kritikus rendszer, konvertáló üzem, üzemanyag gyártó üzem, reprocesszáló üzem, izotópszétválasztó üzem vagy elkülönített tároló létesítmény;
b) bármely olyan telephely, ahol nukleáris anyagot rendszeresen egy effektív kilogrammnál nagyobb mennyiségben használnak fel.
J. „leltárváltozás”: a nukleáris anyag adagokban kifejezett növekedése vagy csökkenése egy anyagmérlegkörzeten belül; az ilyen változás a következők valamelyikét foglalja magában;
a) növekedések:
i. import;
ii. hazai behozatal: behozatal az államokból; más anyagmérlegkörzetekből; biztosítéki intézkedések hatálya alá nem tartozó (nem békés célú) tevékenységből; a biztosítéki intézkedések kezdeti pontjánál;
iii. nukleáris termelés: különleges hasadóanyag előállítása reaktorban;
iv. mentesítés megszűnése: a biztosítéki intézkedések ismételt kiterjesztése olyan anyagra, amely ez alól mentességet kapott felhasználási módja vagy a mennyisége alapján.
b) csökkenések:
i. export;
ii. hazai szállítás: szállítások az államokon belül egy másik anyagmérlegkörzetbe vagy egy nem biztosítéki intézkedések hatálya alá tartozó (nem békés célú) tevékenységhez;
iii. nukleáris veszteség: a nukleáris anyagban bekövetkezett veszteség annak más elemmé (elemekké) vagy izotóppá (izotópokká) történő átalakulása révén, a nukleáris reakciók következtében;
iv. mért hulladék: olyan nukleáris anyag, amelynek mennyiségét mérés vagy a mérések alapján becsléssel meghatározták, és amelyet oly módon kezeltek, hogy további nukleáris célú felhasználásra már nem alkalmas;
v. visszamaradt hulladék: feldolgozásból vagy üzemi balesetből származó nukleáris anyag, amely egyenlőre visszanyerhetetlennek tűnik, de tárolni kell;
vi. mentesítés: a nukleáris anyag mentesítése a biztosítéki intézkedések alkalmazása alól, annak felhasználási módja vagy mennyisége alapján;
vii. egyéb veszteség: például baleset következtében előálló veszteség (azaz a nukleáris anyagnak visszanyerhetetlen és nem szándékos elvesztése egy üzemviteli baleset következtében) vagy lopás.
K. „mérési kulcspont”: olyan hely, ahol a nukleáris anyag az anyagáramlás vagy a leltárkészlet meghatározása céljából megmérhető alakban jelenik meg. A mérési kulcspontok így magukban foglalják - de nem korlátozódnak csak ezekre - az anyagmérlegkörzetek be- és kilépési (beleértve a mért kimeneti anyagokat), valamint tárolási pontjait.
L. Ellenőrzési emberév”: a 80. cikk alkalmazásában 300 ellenőrzési embernap, ahol egy embernap olyan munkanap, amikor egyetlen ellenőr belépve a létesítménybe, ott összesen 8 órát, de ennél nem többet tölt el.
M. „anyagmérlegkörzet”: egy létesítményen belüli vagy azon kívüli terület, ahol:
a) a nukleáris anyag mennyisége minden egyes anyagmérlegkörzeti ki- vagy beszállítás esetében meghatározható;
b) a nukleáris anyag tényleges leltárát minden egyes anyagmérlegkörzetben az előírt eljárások szerint meg lehet határozni, ha szükséges;
hogy az anyagmérleget meg lehessen állapítani az ügynökség biztosítéki intézkedések céljára.
N. „el nem számolt anyag”: a könyv szerinti leltár és a tényleges leltár különbsége.
O. „nukleáris anyag”: az alapokmány XX. cikke szerint meghatározott bármilyen alapüzemanyag vagy bármilyen különleges hasadóanyag. Az „alapüzemanyag kifejezés nem értelmezhető ércre vagy érchulladékra. Ha a kormányzótanács e megállapodás hatálybalépését követően az alapokmány XX. cikke alapján úgy dönt, hogy további anyagokat is alapüzemanyagnak vagy különleges hasadóanyagnak tekint, ez a döntés a megállapodás értelmében csak a Közösség és az államok részéről történő elfogadással válik hatályossá.
P. „tényleges leltár”: az előírt eljárások szerint beszerzett, adott időpontban az anyagmérlegkörzetben rendelkezésre álló nukleáris anyagok adagmennyiségeinek mért vagy származtatott összege.
Q. szállítói/átvevői különbözet”: az egy adagban lévő nukleáris anyagnak a szállító anyagmérlegkörzet által közölt és az átvevő anyagmérlegkörzetben mért mennyisége közötti különbözet.
R. „forrás adatok”: mérések vagy hitelesítések során feljegyzett vagy empirikus összefüggések származtatására használt adatok, amelyek a nukleáris anyagot és az adagadatokat azonosítják. Forrásadatok például a vegyületsúlyok, az elemek mennyiségének meghatározására szolgáló átszámítási tényezők a fajsúly, az elemkoncentráció, az izotóparány, a térfogat- és nyomásmérési értékek közötti összefüggés, valamint a gyártott plutónium és a fejlesztett energia közötti összefüggés.
S. „stratégiai pont”: a létesítményi adatok vizsgálata során kiválasztott hely, ahol rendes feltételek mellett és az összes stratégiai pontból származó információkkal együtt a biztosítéki intézkedésekhez szükséges és elegendő információk adottak és ellenőrzöttek; stratégiai pont lehet bármely hely, ahol az anyagmérleg-nyilvántartásra vonatkozó kulcsfontosságú méréseket végzik, és ahol a területi körülhatárolással kapcsolatos és megfigyelési intézkedéseket végrehajtják.
1. cikk
Ez a jegyzőkönyv kiegészíti a megállapodás egyes kikötéseit, és különösen meghatározza azokat a feltételeket és eljárásokat, amelyek alapján a megállapodásban előírt biztosítéki intézkedések megvalósítása során folytatott együttműködést úgy kell megvalósítani, hogy elkerüljék a Közösség biztosítéki intézkedésekkel kapcsolatos tevékenységének megkettőzését.
2. cikk
A Közösség összegyűjti az ügynökség részére a megállapodás szerint a létesítményekről és a létesítményeken kívüli nukleáris anyagokról átadandó információkat, a kiegészítő megállapodásokhoz csatolt, egyeztetett adatbejelentő kérdőlapok alapján.
3. cikk
Az ügynökség és a Közösség közösen végzik a megállapodás 46. cikk a)-f) pontjában előírt létesítményi adatok vizsgálatát, annak egyeztetett eredményeit a kiegészítő megállapodásokba felveszik. A létesítményi adatoknak a megállapodás 48. cikkében előírt ellenőrzését az ügynökség a Közösséggel együttműködve végzi.
4. cikk
A jegyzőkönyv 2. cikkében említett információknak az ügynökség részére történő átadásakor a Közösség átadja az alkalmazni javasolt ellenőrzési módszerekre vonatkozó információkat is, valamint a teljes javaslatokat, ideértve a rendszeres ellenőrzés során végzett ellenőrzési munkák becslésére vonatkozó javaslatokat, hogy azokat csatolják a létesítmények és a létesítményeken kívüli anyagmérleg-körzetek kiegészítő megállapodásaihoz.
5. cikk
A kiegészítő megállapodások mellékleteit a Közösség és az ügynökség közösen készíti el.
6. cikk
A Közösség az üzemeltetők jelentéseit összegyűjti, a jelentések alapján összesített nyilvántartást vezet, és a kapott információk technikai és könyvelési ellenőrzését és elemzését végzi.
7. cikk
A jegyzőkönyv 6. cikkében említett feladatok teljesítésekor a Közösség havonta elkészíti, és a kiegészítő megállapodásokban meghatározott határidőkön belül az ügynökség rendelkezésére bocsátja a készletváltozási jelentést.
8. cikk
A Közösség továbbá elküldi az ügynökségnek az anyagmérleg-jelentéseket és a tényleges leltárkészlet listákat a kiegészítő megállapodásokban előírt tényleges léltárkészlet-felmérési gyakoriságnak megfelelően.
9. cikk
A jegyzőkönyv 7. és 8. cikkében említett jelentések alakját és formáját az ügynökség és a Közösség közötti megállapodás szerint, a kiegészítő megállapodásokban kell meghatározni.
10. cikk
Az e megállapodás céljából a Közösség és az ügynökség által végzett rendszeres ellenőrzési tevékenységet, beleértve a megállapodás 84. cikkében említett ellenőrzéseket az e jegyzőkönyv 11-23. cikkében foglalt előírások szerint kell koordinálni.
11. cikk
A megállapodás 79. és 80. cikkére is figyelemmel, az ügynökség ellenőrzési tevékenysége tényleges számának, intenzitásának, tartamának, időzítésének és módjának meghatározásakor figyelembe kell venni a Közösség saját multinacionális biztosítékiintézkedés-rendszerének keretei között az e jegyzőkönyv előírásainak megfelelően elvégzett ellenőrzések munkáját.
12. cikk
A megállapodás szerinti ellenőrzési munkákat minden egyes létesítmény esetében a megállapodás 81. cikkének előírásait alkalmazva kell meghatározni. Ezeket a kritériumokat a kiegészítő megállapodásokban meghatározott szabályok és módszerek alkalmazásával kell megvalósítani, amelyeket az ellenőrzési munkák becsléséhez használnak a kiegészítő megállapodásokhoz csatolt egyedi példák alapján. Ezeket a szabályokat és módszereket időről időre felülvizsgálják a megállapodás 7. cikke szerint, a biztosítéki intézkedések területén bekövetkezett technológiai fejlődés és a szerzett tapasztalatok figyelembevétele céljából.
13. cikk
A tényleges ellenőrzési munkák egyhangúlag elfogadott előirányzataként megnevezett, a megállapodás szerinti ellenőrzési munkákat fel kell sorolni a kiegészítő megállapodásokban az ellenőrzési eljárásokra vonatkozó szükséges leírásokkal, valamint a Közösség és az ügynökség által végrehajtott ellenőrzések terjedelmével együtt. Ezek az ellenőrzési munkák jelentik a tényleges maximális ellenőrzési munkákat a megállapodás alá tartozó létesítményekben rendes üzemviteli körülmények között és az alábbiakban felsorolt feltételek mellett:
a) a megállapodás 32. cikkében előírt közösségi biztosítékiintézkedés-rendszerre vonatkozó információk folyamatos érvényessége, a kiegészítő egyezményekben előírt módon;
b) az ügynökség részére a jegyzőkönyv 2. cikke értelmében adott információk folyamatos érvényessége;
c) a megállapodás 60., 61., 63-65. és 67-69. cikke szerinti jelentéseket a Közösség folyamatosan biztosítja, a kiegészítő megállapodásokban előírt módon;
d) az ellenőrzésre vonatkozó együttműködési megállapodások folyamatos alkalmazása a jegyzőkönyv 10-23. cikke szerint, a kiegészítő megállapodásokban előírt módon;
e) a Közösség saját a létesítményre vonatkozó ellenőrzési tevékenységét e cikk szerint, a kiegészítő megállapodásokban előírt módon végzi.
14. cikk
a) E jegyzőkönyv 13. cikkének feltételeire is figyelemmel, az ügynökségi ellenőrzéseit a Közösség ellenőrzési tevékenységével egyidejűleg kell megvalósítani. Az ügynökségi ellenőrök jelen vannak a Közösség által végzett meghatározott ellenőrzések végrehajtásánál.
b) Az a) pont előírására is figyelemmel, ha az ügynökség a megállapodásban meghatározott rendszeres ellenőrzéseinek céljait ezzel elérheti, az ügynökség ellenőrei a megállapodás 74. és 75. cikkének előírásait a közösségi ellenőrök ellenőri tevékenységének megfigyelésével valósítják meg, azonban:
i. ha előreláthatóan az ügynökségi ellenőrök ellenőri tevékenysége a közösségi ellenőrök tevékenységének megfigyelésén túl más módon is megvalósítható, akkor ezeket a módszereket a kiegészítő megállapodásokban pontosabban meg kell határozni;
ii. az ellenőrzés közben az ügynökségi ellenőrök végrehajthatnak a közösségi ellenőrök ellenőrzési tevékenységének megfigyelésén túl egyéb ellenőrzési tevékenységet, ha úgy ítélik meg, hogy ez lényeges és sürgős, és ha az ügynökség ennek hiányában a rendszeres ellenőrzéseinek célját nem tudná elérni, és ez előre nem volt látható.
15. cikk
A közösségi ellenőrzések megállapodás szerinti általános ütemezését és tervezését a Közösség az ügynökséggel együttműködve végzi.
16. cikk
Az ügynökségi ellenőr meghatározott közösségi ellenőrzési tevékenységek végrehajtása közbeni jelenlétére vonatkozó intézkedéseket az ügynökség és a Közösség minden egyes létesítmény és, amennyiben szükséges, az egyedi létesítmények esetében is, előzetesen egyetértve hozza.
17. cikk
Annak érdekében, hogy az ügynökség dönteni tudjon a statisztikai mintavételezési követelmények alapján a különleges közösségi ellenőrzésen való jelenlétéről, a Közösség az ügynökséget előzetesen tájékoztatja a ellenőrzendő tételek számáról, típusairól és tartalmáról a létesítmény üzemeltetőjétől kapott információk alapján.
18. cikk
A technikai eljárásokról az ügynökség és a Közösség általában minden egyes létesítménytípus esetében, és amennyiben szükséges az egyedi létesítmények esetében egyeztet, különösen az alábbiakat illetően:
a) a statisztikai mintavétel szúrópróbaszerű kiválasztási technikájának meghatározása;
b) a szabványok ellenőrzése és azonosítása.
19. cikk
A kiegészítő megállapodásokban mindegyik létesítménytípusra meghatározott általános koordinációs szabályok az egyes létesítményekben meghatározandó koordinációs szabályok alapjául szolgálnak.
20. cikk
A jegyzőkönyv 19. cikke szerinti egyes létesítményekben meghatározott koordinációs szabályokban leírt koordinációs intézkedéseket az e célra kinevezett közösségi és ügynökségi tisztségviselők együtt teszik meg.
21. cikk
A Közösség megküldi az ügynökségnek az azon ellenőrzésre vonatkozó munkairatait, amelyeken az ügynökség ellenőrei részt vettek, továbbá a megállapodás alapján végrehajtott összes többi közösségi ellenőrzésre vonatkozó ellenőrzési jelentéseiket.
22. cikk
Az ügynökség részére a nukleáris anyagmintákat a tételeknek ugyanazokból a szúrópróbaszerűen kiválasztott adagjaiból kell venni, mint ahonnan a Közösség részére is veszik, a közösségi mintavételekkel egyszerre, kivéve, ha az ügynökség ellenőrzési munkájának legkisebb szinten tartása vagy e szintre csökkentése megköveteli az ügynökség független mintavételezését, az előzetes megállapodásban és a kiegészítő megállapodásokban előírtak szerint.
23. cikk
A létesítmény üzemeltetői által és a biztosítéki intézkedések céljából történő tényleges leltárfelvétel gyakoriságát a kiegészítő megállapodásokban meghatározott irányelvekkel összhangban kell meghatározni. Ha a megállapodás alapján további tevékenység végzése is lényegesnek tűnik a tényleges leltárral kapcsolatban, akkor ezeket a jegyzőkönyv 25. cikke szerinti összekötő bizottság tárgyalja meg, és egyhangúlag dönt a végrehajtásról.
24. cikk
Ha az ügynökség az e megállapodásban meghatározott eseti ellenőrzés céljait a Közösség ellenőrzési tevékenységének megfigyelése révén el tudja érni, akkor ezt kell tennie.
25. cikk
a) A megállapodás és e jegyzőkönyv alkalmazásának megkönnyítése érdekében egy, a Közösség és az ügynökség képviselőiből álló összekötő bizottságot hoznak létre.
b) A bizottság évente legalább egyszer ülésezik,
i. felülvizsgálja, különösen, az e jegyzőkönyvben előírt együttműködési megállapodások végrehajtását, beleértve az ellenőrzési munkák együttes minősítését;
ii. megvizsgálja a biztosítéki intézkedésekkel kapcsolatos módszerek és technikák fejlődését;
iii. megtárgyalja a c) pontban említett rendszeres ülések alkalmával elé terjesztett kérdéseket.
c) A bizottság rendszeresen ülésezik alsóbb szinten, hogy különösen és szükség szerint megtárgyalja az egyes létesítmények esetén az e jegyzőkönyvben előírt koordinációs szabályok megvalósulását, beleértve, az ellenőrzési munkák elfogadott becsléseinek korszerűsítését a műszaki és az üzemviteli fejlemények tükrében, tekintettel a teljesítmény, a készlet és a létesítmény üzemviteli programjainak változásaira és a különféle típusú rendszeres ellenőrzések során alkalmazott ellenőrzési eljárásokra, valamint, általába véve a statisztikai mintavételezési követelményekre. Minden nem szabályozott kérdést, a b) pontban említett ülés elé kell terjeszteni.
d) A megállapodás alapján esetleg szükséges, sürgős beavatkozások sérelme nélkül, ha a jegyzőkönyv 13. cikkének alkalmazása során problémák merülnek fel, különösen akkor, ha az ügynökség úgy ítéli meg, hogy az abban meghatározott feltételek nem valósultak meg, a bizottság megfelelő szinten a lehető leghamarabb összeül, hogy felmérje a helyzetet, és tárgyaljon a meghozandó intézkedésekről. Ha a problémát nem lehet rendezni, a bizottság megfelelő javaslatokat tehet a szerződő feleknek, különös tekintettel az ellenőrzési munkák rendszeres ellenőrzési tevékenységekre vonatkozó előirányzatainak módosítására.
e) A bizottság szükség szerint javaslatokat dolgoz ki azon kérdésekkel kapcsolatban, amelyekben a feleknek megegyezésre kell jutniuk.”
4. § A kiegészítő jegyzőkönyv hiteles angol nyelvű szövege és annak hivatalos magyar nyelvű fordítása a következő:
Whereas the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden (hereinafter referred to as ’the States’) and the European Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter referred to as ’the Community’) are parties to an Agreement between the States, the Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the ’the Agency’) in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the ’Safeguards Agreement’), which entered into force on 21 February 1997;
Aware of the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system;
Recalling that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of safeguards the need to avoid hampering the economic and technological development in the Community or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, to respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals, and to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge;
Whereas the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards;
Now therefore the Community, the States and the Agency have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In case of conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply.
Article 2
a. Each State shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iv), (ix) and (x). The Community shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (v), (vi) and (vii). Each State and the Community shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (iii) and (viii).
(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, the State concerned.
(ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in effectiveness or efficiency, and agreed to by the State concerned, on operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used.
(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The description shall include a map of the site.
(iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol.
(v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium concentration plants in each State, and the current annual production of such mines and concentration plants. The Community shall provide, on request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual mine or concentration plant. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy.
(vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the composition and purity suitable, for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, as follows:
(a) The quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended use of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each location in the States at which the material is present in quantities exceeding 10 tonnes of uranium and/or 20 tonnes of thorium, and for other locations with quantities of more than 1 tonne, the aggregate for the States as a whole if the aggregate exceeds 10 tonnes of uranium or 20 tonnes of thorium. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy;
(b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination of each export from the States to a State outside the Community, of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding:
(1) 10 tonnes of uranium, or for successive exports of uranium to the same state, each of less than 10 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 10 tonnes for the year;
(2) 20 tonnes of thorium, or for successive exports of thorium to the same State, each of less than 20 tonnes, but exceeding a total 20 tonnes for the year;
(c) the quantities, chemical composition, current location and use or intended use of each import into the Sates from outside the Community of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding:
(1) 10 tonnes of uranium, or for successive imports of uranium each of less than 10 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 10 tonnes for the year;
(2) 20 tonnes of thorium, or for successive imports of thorium each of less than 20 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 20 tonnes for the year;
it being understood that there is no requirement to provide information on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its non-nuclear end-use form.
(vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement;
(b) Information regarding the quantities (which may be in the form of estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 36(b) of the Safeguards Agreement but not yet in a non-nuclear end-use form, in quantities exceeding those set out in Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy.
(viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have been terminated pursuant to Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement. For the purpose of this paragraph, ’further processing’ does not include repackaging of the waste or its further conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal.
(ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II:
(a) for each export out of the Community of such equipment and material: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected date, of export;
(b) on specific request by the Agency, confirmation by the importing State of information provided to the Agency by a State outside of the Community concerning the export of such equipment and material to the importing State.
(x) General plans for the succeeding 10-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by the appropriate authorities in the State.
b. Each State shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the following information:
(i) a general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material which are specifically related to enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out anywhere in the State concerned but which are not funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, that State. For the purpose of this paragraph ’processing’ of intermediate or high-level waste does not include repackaging of the waste or its conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal.
(ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the person or entity carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the Agency outside a site which the Agency considers might be functionally related to the activities of that site. The provision of this information is subject to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be provided in consultation with the Agency and in a timely fashion.
c. On request by any or all of the Agency, a State or the Community, as appropriate, shall provide amplifications or clarifications of any information provided under this Article, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
Article 3
a. Each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2(a)(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (a), (vii), and (x) and Article 2(b)(i) within 180 days of the entry into force of this Protocol.
b. Each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, updates of the information referred to in paragraph (a) for the period covering the previous calendar year. If there has been no change to the information previously provided, each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall so indicate.
c. The Community shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the information identified in Article 2(a)(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous calendar year.
d. Each State shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information identified in Article 2(a)(ix)(a). This information shall be provided within 60 days of the end of each quarter.
e. The Community and each State shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2(a)(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May of each year, information on changes in location for the period covering the previous calendar year.
f. Each State and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the provision of the information identified in Article 2(a)(ii).
g. Each State shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2(a)(ix)(b) within 60 days of the Agency’s request.
Article 4
The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of complementary access under Article 5 of this Protocol:
a. The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency shall have access to:
(i) Any location referred to in Article 5(a)(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities;
(ii) Any location referred to in Article 5(b) or (c) to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information;
(iii) Any location referred to in Article 5(a)(iii) to the extent necessary for the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the Community’s, or, as appropriate, a State’s declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.
b. (i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii), the Agency shall give the State concerned, or for access under Article 5(a) or under Article 5(c) where nuclear material is involved, the State concerned and the Community, advance notice of access of at least 24 hours.
(ii) For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with design information verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections on that site, the period of advance notice shall, if the Agency so requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may be less than two hours.
c. Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the activities to be carried out during such access.
d. In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the question or inconsistency. Such an opportunity will be provided before a request for access, unless the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the purpose for which the access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not draw any conclusions about the question or inconsistency until the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community have been provided with such an opportunity.
e. Unless otherwise agreed to by the State concerned, access shall only take place during regular working hours.
f. The State concerned, or for access under Article 5(a) or under Article 5(c) where nuclear material is involved, the State concerned and the Community, shall have the right to have agency inspectors accompanied during their access by its representatives and, as appropriate, by Community inspectors provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.
Article 5
Each State shall provide the Agency with access to:
a. (i) Any place on a site;
(ii) Any location identified under Article 2(a)(v) to (viii);
(iii) Any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.
b. Any location identified by the State concerned under Article 2(a)(i), Article 2(a)(iv), Article 2(a)(ix)(b) or Article 2(b), other than those referred to in paragraph (a)(i), provided that if the State concerned is unable to provide such access, that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, through other means.
c. Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b), to carry out location-specific environmental sampling, provided that if the State concerned is unable to provide such access, that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or through other means.
Article 6
When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities:
a. For access in accordance with Article 5(a)(i) or (iii): visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; application of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices specified in Subsidiary Arrangements; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as ’the Board’) and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and the State concerned.
b. For access in accordance with Article 5(a)(ii): visual observation; item counting of nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of records relevant to the quantities, origin and disposition of the material; collection of environmental samples; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and the State concerned.
c. For access in accordance with Article 5(b): visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and the State concerned.
d. For access in accordance with Article 5(c), collection of environmental samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specifed by the Agency pursuant to Article 5(c), utilisation at that location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by the State concerned and, where nuclear material is involved, the Community, and the Agency, other objective measures.
Article 7
a. Upon request by a State, the Agency and that State shall make arrangements for managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an inconsistency relating to that information.
b. A State may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, inform the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be applicable.
c. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, a State may have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of paragraph (a).
Article 8
Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude a State from offering the Agency access to locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from requesting the Agency to conduct verification activities at a particular location. The Agency shall, without delay, make every reasonable effort to act on such a request.
Article 9
Each State shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency to carry out wide-area environmental sampling, provided that if a State is unable to provide such access that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements at alternative locations. The Agency shall not seek such access until the use of wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural arrangements therefor have been approved by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and the State concerned.
Article 10
a. The Agency shall inform the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community of:
(i) the activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community within 60 days of the activities being carried out by the Agency.
(ii) The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community as soon as possible but in any case within 30 days of the results being established by the Agency.
b. The Agency shall inform the State concerned and the Community of the conclusions it has drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions shall be provided annually.
Article 11
a. (i) The Director-General shall notify the Community and the States of the Board’s approval of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. Unless the Community advises the Director-General of the rejection of such an official as an inspector for the States within three months of receipt of notification of the Board’s approval, the inspector so notified to the Community and the States shall be considered designated to the States.
(ii) The Director-General, acting in response to a request by the Community or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the Community and the States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for the States.
b. A notification referred to in paragraph (a) shall be deemed to be received by the Community and the States seven days after the date of the transmission by registered post of the notification by the Agency to the Community and the States.
Article 12
Each State shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of the State concerned for the purpose of carrying out his/her functions. Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required, to cover the duration of the inspector’s designation to the States.
Article 13
a. Where a State or the Community, as appropriate, or the Agency indicate that it is necessary to specify in subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be applied, that State, or that State and the Community and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements within 90 days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where the indication of the need for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after the entry into force of this Protocol, within 90 days of the date of such indication.
b. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol.
Article 14
a. Each State shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for official purposes between Agency inspectors in that State and Agency Headquarters and/or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices. The Agency shall have, in consultation with the State concerned, the right to make use of internationally established systems of direct communications, including satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in that State. At the request of a State, or the Agency, details of the implementation of this paragraph in that State with respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
b. Communication and transmission of information as provided for in paragraph (a) shall take due account of the need to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information or design information which the State concerned regards as being of particular sensitivity.
Article 15
a. The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge, including such information coming to the Agency’s knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol.
b. The regime referred to in paragraph (a) shall include, among others, provisions relating to:
(i) general principles and associated measures for the handling of confidential information;
(ii) conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential information;
(iii) procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality.
c. The regime referred to in paragraph (a) above shall be approved and periodically reviewed by the Board.
Article 16
a. The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the purposes of amendment of Annexes I and II, the term ’Protocol’ as used in this instrument means this Protocol and the Annexes together.
b. The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and material specified in Annex II, may be amended by the Board on the advice of an open-ended working group of experts established by the Board. Any such amendment shall take effect four months after its adoption by the Board.
c. Annex III to this Protocol specifies how measures in this Protocol shall be implemented by the Community and the States.
Article 17
a. This Protocol shall enter into force on the day on which the Agency receives from the Community and the States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met.
b. The States and the Community may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that they will apply this Protocol provisionally.
c. The Director-General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Protocol.
Article 18
For the purpose of this Protocol:
a. „Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities” means: those activities which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of the following:
- conversion of nuclear material,
- enrichment of nuclear material,
- nuclear fuel fabrication,
- reactors,
- critical facilities,
- reprocessing of nuclear fuel,
- processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233,
but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical, hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and improved maintenance.
b. „Site” means: that area delimited by the Community and a State in the relevant design information for a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant information on a location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, including a closed-down location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used (this is limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out). ’Site’ shall also include all installations, colocated with the facility or location, for the provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells for processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; installations for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and buildings associated with specified activities identified by the State concerned under Article 2(a)(iv) above.
c. „Decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities” means: an installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no longer be used to handle, process or utilise nuclear material.
d. „Closed-down facility or closed-down location outside facilities” means: an installation or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but which has not been decommissioned.
e. „High enriched uranium” means: uranium containing 20% or more of the isotope uranium-235.
f. „Location-specific environmental sampling” means: the collection of environmental samples (e. g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a location specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the specified location.
g. „Wide-area environmental sampling” means: the collection of environmental samples (e. g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area.
h. „Nuclear material” means: any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute of the Agency after the entry into force of this Protocol which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Protocol only on acceptance by the Community and the States.
i. „Facility” means:
(i) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation, or
(ii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.
j. „Location outside facilities” means: any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.
Done at Vienna in duplicate, on the twenty second day of September 1998 in the Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts of which are equally authentic except that, in case of divergence, those texts concluded in the official languages of the IAEA Board of Governors shall prevail.
(i) The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges.
Centrifuge rotor tubes means thin-walled cylinders as described at point 5.1.1.(b) of Annex II.
Gas centrifuges means centrifuges as described in the introductory note to point 5.1. of Annex II.
(ii) The manufacture of diffusion barriers.
Diffusion barriers means thin, porous filters as described in point 5.3.1.(a) of Annex II.
(iii) The manufacture or assembly of laser-based systems.
Laser-based systems means systems incorporating those items as described in point 5.7. of Annex II.
(iv) The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators.
Electromagnetic isotope separators means those items referred to in point 5.9.1. of Annex II containing ion sources as described in 5.9.1.(a) of Annex II.
(v) The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment.
Columns or extraction equipment means those items as described in points 5.6.1., 5.6.2., 5.6.3., 5.6.5., 5.6.6., 5.6.7. and 5.6.8. of Annex II.
(vi) The manufacture of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes.
Aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes means separation nozzles and vortex tubes as described respectively in points 5.5.1. and 5.5.2. of Annex II.
(vii) The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems.
Uranium plasma generation systems means systems for the generation of uranium plasma as described in point 5.8.3. of Annex II.
(viii) The manufacture of zirconium tubes. Zirconium tubes means tubes as described in point 1.6. of Annex II.
(ix) The manufacture or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium.
Heavy water or deuterium means deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000.
(x) The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite.
Nuclear grade graphite means graphite having a purity level better than five parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm3.
(xi) The manufacture of flasks for irradiated fuel.
A flask or irradiated fuel means a vessel for the transportation and/or storage of irradiated fuel which provides chemical, thermal and radiological protection, and dissipated decay heat during handling, transportation and storage.
(xii) The manufacture of reactor control rods. Reactor control rods means rods as described in point 1.4. of Annex II.
(xiii) The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels.
Criticality safe tanks and vessels means those items as described in points 3.2. and 3.4. of Annex II.
(xiv) The manufacture of irradiated fuel element chopping machines.
Irradiated fuel element chopping machines means equipment as described in point 3.1. of Annex II.
(xv) The construction of hot cells.
Hot cells means a cell or interconnected cells totalling at least 6 m3 in volume with shielding equal to or greater than the equivalent of 0,5 m of concrete, with a density of 3,2 g/cm3 or greater, outfitted with equipment for remote operations.
1. Reactors and equipment therefor
1.1. Complete nuclear reactors
Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year.
Explanatory note
A ’nuclear reactor’ basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core.
It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as ’zero energy reactors’.
1.2. Reactor pressure vessels
Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which are especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the. primary coolant.
Explanatory note
A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 1.2. as a major shop-fabricated part of a pressure vessel.
Reactor internals (e.g. support columns and plates for the core and other vessel internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.) are normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal support components are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel. These items are sufficiently critical to the safety and reliability of the operation of the reactor (and, therefore, to the guarantees and liability of the reactor supplier), so that their supply, outside the basic supply arrangement for the reactor itself, would not be common practice. Therefore, although the separate supply of these unique, especially designed and prepared, critical, large and expensive items would not necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of concern, such a mode of supply is considered unlikely.
1.3. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines
Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. capable of on-load operation or employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off-load fuelling operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally available.
1.4. Reactor control rods
Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1.
Explanatory note
This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension structures therefor is supplied separately.
1.5. Reactor pressure tubes
Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. at an operating pressure in excess of 5,1 MPa (740 psi).
1.6. Zirconium tubes
Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg in any period of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1., and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts by weight.
1.7. Primary coolant pumps
Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating the primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1.
Explanatory note
Especially designed or prepared pumps may include elaborate sealed or multisealed systems to prevent leakage of primary coolant, canned-driven pumps, and pumps with inertial mass systems. This definition encompasses pumps certified to NC-1 or equivalent standards.
2. Non-nuclear materials for reactors
2.1. Deuterium and heavy water
Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.
2.2. Nuclear grade graphite
Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm3 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. in quantities exceeding 3 x 104 kg (30 tonnes) for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.
Note
For the purpose of reporting, the government will determine whether or not the exports of graphite meeting the above specifications are for nuclear reactor use.
3. Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor
Introductory note
Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from intensely radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different technical processes can accomplish this separation. However, over the years purex has become the most commonly used and accepted process. Purex involves the dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by separation of the uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using a mixture of tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent.
Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated fuel element chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor storage. There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide or metal, and treatment of fission product waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage or disposal. However, the specific type and configuration of the equipment performing these functions may differ between purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into the design of the facility.
A ’plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements’ included the equipment and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material and fission product processing streams.
These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and plutonium metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid criticality (e.g. by geometry), radiation exposure (e.g. by shielding), and toxicity hazards (e.g. by containment).
Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase ’and equipment especially designed or prepared’ for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements include:
3.1. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines
Introductory note
This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear material to dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most commonly employed, although advanced equipment, such as lasers, may be used.
Remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods.
3.2. Dissolvers Introductory note
Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe vessels, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining hulls removed from the process stream.
Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained.
3.3. Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment
Introductory note
Solvent extractors both receive the solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers and the organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission products. Solvent extraction equipment is normally designed to meet strict operating parameters, such as long operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or adaptability to easy replacement, simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility for variations in process conditions.
Especially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse columns, mixer settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are normally fabricated to extremely high standards (including special welding and inspection and quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of low carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium, or other high quality materials.
3.4. Chemical holding or storage vessels
Introductory note
Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding or storage vessels are used in the further processing of all three streams, as follows:
(a) the pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and passed to a denitration process where it is converted to uranium oxide. This oxide is reused in the nuclear fuel cycle;
(b) the intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally concentrated by evaporation and stored as a liquor concentrate. This concentrate may be subsequently evaporated and converted to a form suitable for storage or disposal;
(c) the pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending its transfer to further process steps. In particular, holding or storage vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to avoid criticality problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this stream.
Especially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The holding or storage vessels must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally fabricated of materials such as low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high quality materials. Holding or storage vessels may be designed for remote operation and maintenance and may have the following features for control of nuclear criticality:
1. walls or internal structures with a boron equivalent of at least 2%, or
2. a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7 in) for cylindrical vessels, or
3. a maximum width of 75 mm (3 in) for either a slab or annular vessel.
3.5. Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system
Introductory note
In most reprocessing facilities, this final process involves the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide. The main functions involved in this process are: process feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid/liquor separation, calcination, product handling, ventilation, waste management, and process control.
Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the conversion of plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimise toxicity hazards.
3.6. Plutonium oxide to metal production system
Introductory note
This process, which could be related to a reprocessing facility, involves the fluorination of plutonium dioxide, normally with highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride, to produce plutonium fluoride which is subsequently reduced using high purity calcium metal to produce metallic plutonium and a calcium fluoride slag. The main functions involved in this process are: fluorination (e.g. involving equipment fabricated or lined with a precious metal), metal reduction (e.g. employing ceramic crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation, waste management and process control.
Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the production of plutonium metal, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimise toxicity hazards.
4. Plants for the fabrication of fuel elements
A ’plant for the fabrication of fuel elements’ includes the equipment:
(a) which normally comes in direct contact with, or directly processes, or controls, the production flow of nuclear material, or
(b) which seals the nuclear material within the cladding.
5. Plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium and equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared therefor
Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase ’equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared’ for the separation of isotopes of uranium include:
5.1. Gas centrifuges and assemblies and components especially designed or prepared for use in gas centrifuges
Introductory note
The gas centrifuge normally consists of a thin-walled cylinder(s) of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter contained in a vacuum environment and spun at high peripheral speed of the order of 300 m/s or more with its central axis vertical. In order to achieve high speed the materials of construction for the rotating components have to be of a high strength to density ratio and the rotor assembly, and hence its individual components, have to be manufactured to very close tolerances in order to minimise the imbalance. In contrast to other centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment is characterised by having within the rotor chamber a rotating disc-shaped baffle(s) and a stationary tube arrangement for feeding and extracting to UF6 gas and featuring at least three separate channels, of which two are connected to scoops extending from the rotor axis towards the periphery of the rotor chamber. Also contained within the vacuum environment are a number of critical items which do not rotate and which although they are especially designed are not difficult to fabricate nor are they fabricated out of unique materials. A centrifuge facility however requires a large number of these components, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.
5.1.1. Rotating components
(a) Complete rotor assemblies
Thin-walled cylinders, or a number of interconnected thin-walled cylinders, manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory note to this section. If interconnected, the cylinders are joined together by flexible bellows or rings as described in Section 5.1.1.(c) following. The rotor is fitted with an internal baffle(s) and end caps, as described in Section 5.1.1.(d) and (e) following, if in final form. However the complete assembly may be delivered only partly assembled.
(b) Rotor tubes
Especially designed or prepared thin-walled cylinders with thickness of 12 mm (0,5 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in), and manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory note to this section.
(c) Rings or bellows
Components especially designed or prepared to give localised support to the rotor tube or to join together a number of rotor tubes. The bellows is a short cylinder of wall thickness 3 mm (0,12 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 m (16 in), having a convolute, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory note to this section.
(d) Baffles
Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 m (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to be mounted inside the centrifuge rotor tube, in order to isolate the take-off chamber from the main separation chamber and, in some cases, to assist the UF6 gas circulation within the main separation chamber of the rotor tube, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory note to this section.
(e) Top caps/bottom caps
Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to fit to the ends of the rotor tube, and so contain the UF6 within the rotor tube, and in some cases to support, retain or contain as an integrated part an element of the upper bearing (top cap) or to carry the rotating elements of the motor and lower bearing (bottom cap), and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory note to this section.
Explanatory note
The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are:
(a) maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2,05 x 109 N/m2 (300 000 psi) or more,
(b) aluminium alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 0,46 x 109 N/m2 (67 000 psi) or more,
(c) filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a specific modulus of 12,3 x 106 m or greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength of 0,3 x 106 m or greater (’Specific Modulus’ is the Young’s Modulus in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m3 ’Specific Ultimate Tensile Strength’ is the ultimate tensile strength in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m3.
5.1.2. Static components
(a) Magnetic suspension bearings
Especially designed or prepared bearing assemblies consisting of an annular magnet suspended within a housing containing a damping medium. The housing will be manufactured from a UF6-resistant material (see explanatory note to Section 5.2.). The magnet couples with a pole piece or a second magnet fitted to the top cap described in Section 5.1.1.(e). The magnet may be ring-shaped with a relation between outer and inner diameter smaller or equal to 1,6:1. The magnet may be in a form having an initial permeability of 0,15 H/m (120 000 in CGS units) or more, or a remanence of 98,5% or more, or an energy product of greater than 80 kJ/m3 (107 gauss-oersteds). In addition to the usual material properties, it is a prerequisite that the deviation of the magnetic axes from the geometrical axes is limited to very small tolerances (lower than 0,1 mm or 0,004 in) or that homogeneity of the material of the magnet is specially called for.
(b) Bearings/dampers
Especially designed or prepared bearings comprising a pivot/cup assembly mounted on a damper. The pivot is normally a hardened steel shaft with a hemisphere at one end with a means of attachment to the bottom cap described in section 5.1.1.(e) at the other. The shaft may however have a hydrodynamic bearing attached. The cup is pellet-shaped with a hemispherical indentation in one surface. These components are often supplied separately to the damper.
(c) Molecular pumps
Especially designed or prepared cylinders having internally machined or extruded helical grooves and internally machines bores. Typical dimensions are as follows: 75 mm (3 in) to 400 mm (16 in) internal diameter, 10 mm (0,4 in) or more wall thickness, with the length equal to or greater than the diameter. The grooves are typically rectangular in cross-section and 2 mm (0,08 in) or more in depth.
(d) Motor stators
Especially designed or prepared ring-shaped stators for high speed multiphase AC hysteresis (or reluctance) motors for synchronous operation within a vacuum in the frequency range of 600-2000 Hz and a power range of 50-1000 VA. The stators consist of multiphase windings on a laminated low loss iron core comprised of thin layers typically 2,0 mm (0,08 in) thick or less.
(e) Centrifuge housing/recipients
Components especially designed designed or prepared to contain the rotor tube assembly of a gas centrifuge. The housing consists of a rigid cylinder of wall thickness up to 30 mm (1,2 in) with precision machined ends to locate the bearings and with one or more flanges for mounting. The machined ends are parallel to each other and perpendicular to the cylinder’s longitudinal axis to within 0,05 degrees or less. The housing may also be a honeycomb type structure to accommodate several rotor tubes. The housings are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.
(f) Scoops
Especially designed or prepared tubes up to 12 mm (0,5 in) internal diameter for the extraction of UF6 gas from within the rotor tube by a pilot tube action (that is, with an aperture facing into the circumferential gas flow within the rotor tube, for example by bending the end of a radially disposed tube) and capable of being fixed to the central gas extraction system. The tubes are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.
5.2. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gas centrifuge enrichment plants
Introductory note
The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the centrifuges, to link the individual centrifuges to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the ’product’ and ’tails’ UF6 from the centrifuges, together with the equipment required to drive the centrifuges or to control the plant.
Normally UF6 is evaporated from the solid using heated autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the centrifuges by way of cascade header pipework. The ’product’ and ’tails’ UF6 gaseous streams flowing from the centrifuges are also passed by way of cascade header pipework to cold traps [operating at about 203 K (-70 °C)] where they are condensed prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because an enrichment plant consists of many thousands of centrifuges arranged in cascades there are many kilometres of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with a substantial amount of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems including:
- feed autoclaves (or stations), used for passing UF6 to the centrifuge cascades at up to 100 kPa (15 psi) and at a rate of 1 kg/h or more,
- desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the cascades at up to 3 kPa (0,5 psi) pressure. The desublimers are capable of being chilled to 203 K (-70 °C) and heated to 343 K (70 °C),
- ’product’ and ’tails’ stations used for trapping UF6 into containers.
This plant, equipment and pipework is wholly made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials (see explanatory note to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.2. Machine header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within the centrifuge cascades. The piping network is normally of the ’triple’ header system with each centrifuge connected to each of the headers. There is thus a substantial amount of repetition in its form. It is wholly made of UF6-resistant materials (see explanatory note to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.3. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking ’on-line’ samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
1. unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. having a collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.2.4. Frequency changers Frequency changers (also known as converters or invertors) especially designed or prepared to supply motor stators as defined under 5.1.2.(d), or parts, components and subassemblies of such frequency changers having all of the following characteristics:
1. a multiphase output of 600 to 2000 Hz;
2. high stability (with frequency control better than 0,1%);
3. low harmonic distortion (less than 2%), and
4. an efficiency of greater than 80%.
Explanatory note
The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the centrifuges and the passage of the gas from centrifuge to centrifuge and cascade to cascade.
Materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel.
5.3. Especially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment
Introductory note
In the gaseous diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main technological assembly is a special porous gaseous diffusion barrier, heat exchanger for cooling the gas (which is heated by the process of compression), seal valves and control valves, and pipelines. Inasmuch as gaseous diffusion technology uses uranium hexafluoride (UF6), all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF6. A gaseous diffusion facility requires a number of these assemblies, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.
5.3.1. Gaseous diffusion barriers
(a) Especially designed or prepared thin, porous filters, with a pore size of 100-1000 A (angstroms), a thickness of 5 mm (0,2 in) or less, and for tubular forms, a diameter of 25 mm (1 in) or less, made of metallic, polymer or ceramic materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, and
(b) specially prepared compounds or powders for the manufacture of such filters. Such compounds and powders include nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel, aluminium oxide, or UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers having a purity of 99,9% or more, a particle size less than 10 microns, and a high degree of particle size uniformity, which are especially prepared for the manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers.
5.3.2. Diffuser housings
Especially designed or prepared hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm (12 in;) in diameter and greater than 900 mm (35 in) in length, or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, which have an inlet connection and two outlet connections all of which are greater than 50 mm (2 in) in diameter, for containing the gaseous diffusion barrier, made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials and designed for horizontal or vertical installation.
5.3.3. Compressors and gas blowers
Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement compressors, or gas blowers with a suction volume Capacity of 1 m3/min. or more of UF6 and with a discharge pressure of up to several hundred kPa (100 psi), designed for long-term operation in the UF6 environment with of without an electrical motor of appropriate power, as well as separate assemblies of such compressors and gas blowers. These compressors and gas blowers have a pressure ratio between 2:1 and 6:1 and are made of, or lined with, materials resistant to UF6.
5.3.4. Rotary shaft seals
Especially designed or prepared vacuum seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against in-leaking of air into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with UF6. Such seals are normally designed for a buffer gas in-leakage rate of less than 1000 cm3/min (60 in3/min).
5.3.5. Heat exchangers for cooling UF6
Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials (except stainless steel) or with copper or any combination of those metals, and intended for a leakage pressure change rate of less than 10 Pa (0,0015 psi) per hour under a pressure difference of 100kPa(15psi).
5.4. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment
Introductory note
The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the gaseous diffusion assembly, to link the individual assemblies to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the ’product’ and ’tails’ UF6 from the diffusion cascades. Because of the high inertial properties of diffusion cascades, any interruption in their operation, and especially their shutdown, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, a strict and constant maintenance of vacuum in all technological systems, automatic protection from accidents, and precise automated regulation of the gas flow is of importance in a gaseous diffusion plant. All this leads to a need to equip the plant with a large number of special measuring, regulating and controlling systems.
Normally UF6 is evaporated from cylinders placed within autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the entry point by way of cascade header pipework. The ’product’ and ’tails’ UF6 gaseous streams flowing from exit points are passed by way of cascade header pipework to either cold traps or to compression stations where the UF6 gas is liquefied prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant consists of a large number of gaseous diffusion assemblies arranged in cascades, there are many kilometres of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with substantial amounts of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.4.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems, capable of operating at pressures of 300 kPa (45 psi) or less, including:
- feed autoclaves (or systems), used for passing UF6 to the gaseous diffusion cascades,
- desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from diffusion cascades,
- liquefaction stations where UF6 gas from the cascade is compressed and cooled to form liquid UF6,
- ’product’ or ’tails’ stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.
5.4.2. Header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within the gaseous diffusion cascades. This piping network is normally of the ’double’ header system with each cell connected to each of the headers.
5.4.3. Vacuum systems
(a) Especially designed or prepared large vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps having a suction capacity of 5 m3/min. (175 ft3/min.) or more.
(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres made of, or lined with, aluminium, nickel, or alloys bearing more than 60% nickel. These pumps may be either rotary or positive, may have displacement and fluorocarbon seals, and may have special working fluids present.
5.4.4. Special shut-off and control valves
Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of UF6-resistant materials with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm (1,5 to 59 in) for installation in main and auxiliary systems of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.
5.4.5. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking on-line samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
1. unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. Electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
Explanatory note
The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of, or lined with, UF6-resistant materials. For the purposes of the sections relating to gaseous diffusion items the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, aluminium oxide, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
5.5. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in aerodynamic enrichment plants
Introductory note
In aerodynamic enrichment processes, a mixture of gaseous UF6 and light gas (hydrogen of helium) is compressed and then passed through separating elements wherein isotopic separation is accomplished by the generation of high centrifugal forces over a curved-wall geometry. Two processes of this type have been successfully developed: the separation nozzle process and the vortex tube process. For both processes the main components of a separation stage include cylindrical vessels housing the special separation elements (nozzles or vortex tubes), gas compressors and heat exchangers to remove the heat of compression. An aerodynamic plant requires a number of these stages, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use. Since aerodynamic processes use UF6 all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF6.
Explanatory note
The items listed in this section either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of or protected by UF6-resistant materials. For the purpose of the section relating to aerodynamic enrichments items, the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
5.5.1. Separation nozzles
Especially designed or prepared separation nozzles and assemblies thereof. The separation nozzles consist of slit-shaped, curved channels having a radius of curvature less than 1 mm (typically 0,1 to 0,05 mm), resistant to corrosion by UF6 and having a knife-edge within the nozzle that separates the gas flowing through the nozzle into two fractions.
5.5.2. Vortex tubes
Especially designed or prepared vortex tubes and assemblies thereof. The vortex tubes are cylindrical or tapered, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, having a diameter of between 0,5 cm and 4 cm, a length to diameter ratio of 20:1 or less and with one or more tangential inlets. The tubes may be equipped with nozzle-type appendages at either or both ends.
Explanatory note
The feed gas enters the vortex tube tangentially at one end or through swirl vanes or at numerous tangential positions along the periphery of the tube.
5.5.3. Compressors and gas blowers
Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal or positive displacement compressors or gas blowers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 and with a suction volume capacity of 2 m3/min. or more of UF6/carrier gas (hydrogen or helium) mixture.
Explanatory note
These compressors and gas blowers typically have a pressure ratio between 1,2:1 and 6:1.
5.5.4. Rotary shaft seals
Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with a UF6/carrier gas mixture.
5.5.5. Heat exchangers for gas cooling
Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.
5.5.6. Separation element housings
Especially designed or prepared separation element housings, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, for containing vortex tubes or separation nozzles.
Explanatory note
These housings may be cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm in diameter and greater than 900 mm in length, or may be rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, and may be designed for horizontal or vertical installation.
5.5.7. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including:
(a) feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the enrichment process;
(b) desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating;
(c) solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or solid form;
(d) ’product’ or ’tails’ stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.
5.5.8. Header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared header piping systems, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 for handling UF6 within the aerodynamic cascades. This piping network is normally of the ’double’ header design with each stage or group of stages connected to each of the headers.
5.5.9. Vacuum systems and pumps
(a) Especially designed or prepared vacuum systems having a suction capacity of 5 m3/min or more, consisting of vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps, and designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres.
(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed or prepared for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres and made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6. These pumps may use fluorocarbon seals and special working fluids.
5.5.10. Special shut-off and control valves
Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm for installation in main and auxiliary systems of aerodynamic enrichment plants.
5.5.11. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking ’on-line’ samples of feed, ’product’ or ’tails’, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
1. unit resolution for mass greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. electron bombardment ionisation sources;
